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Abstract
This article aims to develop the agenda of a grounded, contextual critical geopolitics, with particular
emphasis on the interaction between local and hegemonic geopolitics. This is achieved by 
examining the local reception of the geopolitics of the 'global war on terror' (GWOT) in the context 
of the establishment of US bases on Romanian territory following the 2004 US Global Posture 
Review. A close reading of this context reveals a complex and ambiguous relationship, 
simultaneously assertive and subversive, between the GWOT's sui generis, territorially non-specifc 
geopolitics of transit, and Romania's exceptionalist geopolitics of place, signifcance, and 
convergence. Not only did the GWOT geopolitics fail to erase local geopolitics, but it also became 
muddied, contaminated, and inadvertently destroyed by the 'old' local geopolitical knowledge. This 
suggests an understanding of geopolitics as a palimpsest, the product of serial, imperfect, 
synchronic and diachronic erasures and writings-over that produce geopolitical knowledge of, and 
in different contexts. In broader conceptual terms, this study highlights the heteroglossia of 
geopolitical knowledge, the resilience of local geopolitics, and the importance of contextual 
sensitivity in the pursuit of the normative mission of critical geopolitics.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite arguments that it was only an epiphenomenon, rather than a fundamental 
shift in world politics (Kennedy-Pipe and Rengger, 2006),  the politics and ethics of the 
global war on terror (GWOT) have been etched in the practices of international politics as 
well as in the daily routines of contemporary life (Amoore, 2009). In addition, both the 
nature and the effects of the geopolitics of the GWOT are still highly contested, primarily 
due to the fragmented conceptual landscape of its analysis, and the absence of detailed 
empirical data that truly refects its global nature. On the frst count, critical interpretations 
of the geopolitics of the GWOT must still reconcile its unprecedented combination of 
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evoke familiar hegemonic geopolitical projects (Dalby 2007; Gregory, 1995; Kearns 2006). 
On the second count, questions also remain about the operation, transmission and 
reception of the GWOT in places other than its ideological epicentre and military theatres 
(Bialasiewicz et al., 2007; Coleman, 2003; Dalby, 2003; Gregory 2004; Ryan, 2011).
In this context, the task of this article is twofold: to examine the inscription of the 
GWOT in a previously ignored local context, and through this, to further elaborate the 
conceptual and normative parameters of a contextual, grounded critical geopolitics along 
the lines initially formulated in the pages of this journal (Ó Tuathail, 2010). Indeed, it was in
analyses of the GWOT that the calls for grounding critical geopolitics emerged, starting 
from a recognition of the 'inherently contested nature of the geographies at the heart of the
war on terror', which are continually remade as 'people invariably fnd ways to reimagine 
and contest them, albeit in different ways and to different extents' (Ingram and Dodds, 
2009: 11). This paper will illustrate precisely such a reimagination and contestation through 
the grounding of critical geopolitics in the context of the establishment in Romania of US 
bases following the 2004 US Global Posture Review (GPR). While the need to examine 'the 
geopolitical imagination of the War on Terror from non-Western [sources]' (Sharp 2011: 
297) has already been recognised, Romania is an intriguing addition to the roster of studies 
of the local geopolitics of the GWOT.
First, the context of Romania attests the ambiguity of geopolitical knowledge 
positions suggested by the reference to the 'non-Western' in this last statement. Given its 
current membership of NATO and the EU, it is easy to forget that Romania's membership 
campaign – as that of other East European states – was phrased for an entire decade in 
terms of its 'return to Europe' and becoming (like) the 'West' (Ciută, 2007; also Kuus, 2007). 
Second, this story stands in stark contrast to other accounts of the base politics of the 
GWOT.  The US bases were received in Romania with widespread approval across the 
political establishment and public opinion, rather than with resistance (Davis, 2011) or the 
violent collusion of local elites (Oza, 2007; Sidaway, 2010; Vine, 2009; Woon, 2011). Using a 
qualitative methodology combining elements of critical discourse analysis, process-tracing 
interviews with foreign policy offcials in Washington and Bucharest, and a decade-long 
survey of Romanian printed mass media, I will argue that this overt embrace masks a 
complex relationship – historical, conceptual and moral – between the hegemonic 
geopolitics of the GWOT and the geopolitics locally inscribed. This simultaneously 
contradictory and mutually-supportive coexistence shows that local geopolitics not only 
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on the hegemonic scripts of the present.
I begin my argument with a discussion of the conceptual and normative dimensions
of grounded critical geopolitics, with the aim of feshing out the understanding of 
geopolitics as a palimpsest. The characteristics of the geopolitics of the GWOT and GPR 
are discussed in the next section, followed by a sketch of the policy context of its reception 
in Romania. The fourth section provides a reading of Romanian geopolitics, while in the 
fnal section I analyse this paradoxical intersection of geopolitical knowledge. In the 
conclusion, I will map the implications for the conceptual and normative agenda of 
grounded critical geopolitics.
GEOPOLITICS AS PALIMPSEST: HETEROGLOSSIA AND SUBVERSION
For grounded critical geopolitics, contextualization is, as Geertz would put it, the 
name of the game (2000: xi).1 To be sure, contextual perspectives are far from homogenous 
in epistemological and normative terms (Ciută, 2009), and have already been incorporated 
in feminist, postcolonial or ethnographic approaches in political geography, as well as more 
specifcally in the literature on subaltern geopolitics (Sidaway, 2012; Sharp, 2011, 2013). 
However, in critical geopolitics the need for accentuated 'grounding' emerged from a very 
specifc concern with the relationship between what Agnew (2007) has called 'geographies 
of knowledge'. It is also here that the need for conceptual and normative disambiguation 
arises.
While noting the homogenizing and simplifying nature of the geopolitics of the 
GWOT (2010: 256), Ó Tuathail also observed that some of its denunciations have manifested
a similar 'tendency to fatten geopolitical practices and homogenize geopolitical discourses 
rather than appreciate their cultural thickness, contested articulations and unstable 
heteroglossia' (2008: 342). 'Grounding' was thus the antidote to these failures of geopolitical
thinking, enabling both the epistemological task of critical geopolitics to delineate 'the 
circulation of ideas among places […] and investigate in empirical detail how this actually 
plays out' (Kuus, 2013: 33), and its emancipatory mission to unmask and undo the effects of 
hegemonic discourses and practices (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail, 2005: 645).
Epistemologically, the localizing impulse of critical geopolitics is best captured in its
heightened sensitivity to the heteroglossia of geopolitical discourses and knowledge. 
Originally, Bakhtin used the concept of heteroglossia to draw attention to the importance of
context, which 'can refract, add to, or, in some cases, even subtract from the amount and 
kind of meaning the utterance may be said to have when it is conceived only as a systematic
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words, not only that different actors can assign different meanings to a particular discourse 
which is shown to be inherently polysemic, and not only that a discourse can achieve 
different meanings in different contexts. Equally importantly, heteroglossia also brings into 
focus the constant, but often neglected multiplicity of voices that speak in any one 
particular discourse. Applied to our case study, this is to say that the geopolitical / 
ideological discourse of the GWOT is stratifed, fragmented, and 'destroyed' (cf. Morris, 
1994: 16) through, and into multiple local 'groundings'.
While earlier references in political geography took heteroglossia to refect 'the 
power of place and the transcendence of geography' (Folch-Serra, 1990: 268), grounded 
critical geopolitics prioritises a heteroglossic approach also for its emphasis on the role of 
power, hierarchy and their contestation as ubiquitous ingredients of every discursive 
encounter. This is all the more signifcant when it comes to the analysis of the geopolitical 
discourses of (and about) hegemonic powers. As suggested by Ó Tuathail, in this sense 
heteroglossia enables a detailed grasp of the 'disjunctures and contradictions in the 
relationship between the grounded local and the foreign policy discourse and practices of 
the major powers' (2010: 263).
As the last statement suggests, hegemony and heteroglossia are locked in a complex 
relationship that requires contextualization, as Bakhtin argued at length in his work. This is 
far from a trivial point in critical geopolitics, where authors such as Agnew have suggested 
that the effect of hegemonic geopolitical thinking is to draw 'elites (and populations) [to] 
accept and even laud ideas and practices about world politics and their place in it that they 
import from more powerful countries' (Agnew, 2007: 145, emphases added). In this 
formulation – closely aligned with the Marcusean perspective on the tendency of the 
oppressed to 'identify […] with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it 
their own development and satisfaction' (Marcuse, 1964: 13) – practices of import clearly 
entail a unidirectional circulation and monoglossic understanding of geopolitical 
knowledge. 
In contrast, echoing Said's call to 'take account of both […] imperialism and 
resistance to it' (1994: 66), Ó Tuathail pointed out precisely that the practices of 'import' 
deplored by Agnew are heteroglossic, given that 'localized conditions, structures and power 
struggles mediate and subvert international interventionist practices' (Ó Tuathail, 2010: 263, 
emphasis added). In this reading, heteroglossia is inherently subversive, which makes it a 
constitutive part of the normative imperative of contextual sensitivity, which Kuus describes 
as 'central to destabilizing hegemonic knowledge' (2013: 33). The upshot of the dual 
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appears in all its forms – localized, subaltern, marginal – as an analytical perspective pre-
committed to 'the moral authority of the view from below' (Sharp, 2011: 304). However, 
subversion also happens from somewhere, and thus it too must be grounded in critical 
geopolitical analysis, as must be its moral authority. As Ingram and Dodds very aptly 
observed, the war on terror is not inscribed 'across some kind of geopolitical tabula rasa 
but across landscapes that bear the marks of pre-existing and multiple struggles over 
enduring colonial, Cold War and other geopolitical orders' (2009: 7).
Understanding geopolitics as a palimpsest best captures such serial, imperfect, 
synchronic and diachronic erasures and writings-over that produce geopolitical knowledge 
of, and in different contexts. Initially deployed in studies of cultural landscapes, the 
metaphor of the palimpsest is inherently heteroglossic: its defnition – a manuscript on 
which successive texts are written, each of them partly erased to make room for the next – 
connotes the 'multilayered structure that emphasizes the coexistence of multiple visions 
and impacts of different cultures' (Mitin, 2010: 2111). In addition, a palimpsestic view also 
denotes the intrinsic historicity of geopolitics. Since a palimpsest not only provides the 
material support for, but also is the 'succession' of texts that produce it, to see geopolitics as
palimpsest encourages us to see 'the histories in the everyday world, to look for the traces 
of the biography of places' (Crang, 1996: 442). Notably, among committed contextualist 
geographers, Massey was somewhat sceptical of expressing heteroglossia through the 
form/metaphor of the palimpsest, for it suggested the notion of the 'colonial text as writing 
over a thereby obliterated other' (Massey, 2005: 110). However, my interpretation of a 
geopolitical palimpsest see local geopolitics as 'a kind of indelible ink of the palimpsest that
cannot be fully erased' (Braun, 2007-8: 2). In other words, it is in the nature of palimpsests 
never to be fully erased, because 'the dense juxtaposition, repetitions, and weight of 
multiple mythologies, reduces the power of any single original story to dictate the form of 
the fnal palimpsest produced' (14). A geopolitical palimpsest is therefore the quintessential
way in which the local 'consistently in one way or another reasserts itself' (Massey, 2005: 88).
From this conceptual vantage point, the case of Romania provides a useful 
opportunity to elicit the historical context and heteroglossic character of the encounter 
between local and hegemonic geopolitics, as well as the normatively 'ambiguous position of
[local] actors in relation to hegemonic practices' (Kuus, 2013: 30). Paraphrasing Genette, 
what we can see in the Romanian context is 'how a myth can, with a little help, “read 
another”' (Genette, 1997: 399). While its sheer magnitude makes it tempting to generalise 
the irresistible and destructive impact of the geopolitical template implemented through 
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geopolitical horizons in which Romania's (self) inscription in the matrix of the GWOT was 
enabled by, and performed through, recitations of its own locally sedimented geopolitics. 
Despite the imperative tenor in which the GWOT fatly abolished the particularity of place,
the presence of the US bases was signifed by the Romanian elites in a register that 
rewarded Romania's entrenched geopolitical identity. Rather than mere import or 
obliteration, the result was an imperfect writing of the geopolitics of the GWOT on the 
local geopolitical palimpsest. Not only did the GWOT geopolitics fail to erase the local, but 
it also became muddied, contaminated, and inadvertently destroyed by the 'old' local 
geopolitical knowledge. Hegemonic 'writing' and local 'import' were accompanied by an 
unexpected kind of resistance that took place in the name of a series of earlier 'imported' 
(written-over) and similarly heteroglossic hegemonic geopolitics. But before delving into 
the Romanian context, the GWOT's own geopolitics must be charted.
THE BASE-GEOPOLITICS OF THE GWOT
The logistical structure of the GWOT emerged almost entirely from a single 
quantum of strategic planning, the 2004 US Department of Defence GPR. The GPR was a 
blueprint for the reconfguration of the military presence of the US to address the 
challenges of fghting the distant battles of the war on terror, encompassing 'a cross-section
of relationships, activities, facilities, legal arrangements, and global sourcing and surge', 
elements designed to support 'security cooperation efforts and […] enable prompt global 
military action' (US DoD, 2004a: 7).
Central to the GPR was a triad of new basing concepts which refected the need for 
a military presence that was global, networked and free from local political constraints. Its 
'tiered power-projection deployment scheme' (Noonan, 2004: 2) consisted of Main 
Operating Bases (MOB) with permanently stationed combat forces and robust 
infrastructure; Forward Operating Sites (FOS), expandable facilities with limited military 
personnel and prepositioned equipment, designed primarily for bilateral and regional 
training; and Cooperative Security Locations (CSL), facilities with little or no permanent 
presence whose purpose was primarily to 'provide contingency access and be a focal point 
for security cooperation activities' (US DoD, 2004a: 10). A pivotal role in this network was 
played by the new types of bases, the small and austere FOS / CSL which became known in
English-speaking policy and media circles as 'lily-pads', a designation frst used by former 
SACEUR General James L. Jones (Anderson, 2003; Combat Films, 2005). In line with the 
political vision of the GWOT, lily-pads had to fulfl three conditions: be located in places 
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'fexible legal and support arrangements' were in place; and be in the proximity of potential
crisis points, allowing rapid, preferably instant deployment (Rumsfeld, 2004b: 3).
Hailed as the 'most profound re-ordering of U.S. military forces overseas' since 
World War II, the GPR was deliberately transformative (US DoD, 2004a: 2; for a more 
sceptical view, see O'Hanlon, 2008: 9). The new base structure envisaged by the GPR was 
seen as 'not merely a derivative of strategy [but] a driver in its own right' (OBC, 2005: 6), 
and as a consequence, it appeared from the start 'inescapably, indeed overwhelmingly, 
political in terms of its effect on the rest of the world' (Bloomfeld, 2006: 49). As one of its 
key architects argued, there was 'not going to be a place in the world where it's going to be 
the same as it used to be' (Douglas J.  Feith, quoted in Campbell and Johnson Ward, 2003: 
95). Through its emphasis on maximising access, speed, and impact, the GPR thus was not 
only the logistical vehicle the GWOT (Rumsfeld, 2004a, b; US Senate, 2004: 93), but was 
also intrinsic to defning the features of its geopolitics: novelty, territorial non-specifcity, 
and transit.
For its architects, the GPR was a testament of 'ingenuity, innovation, and progress' 
(Rumsfeld, 2004a). Although Bush administration offcials stressed that the posture review 
was not determined 'by transient considerations of current events' (Douglas J. Feith, in 
Schrader, 2003: 2), this was not meant to suggest a disconnect between the GPR and the 
GWOT, but to assert the sui generis nature and transformational power of the geopolitics of 
the GWOT itself. Since the GWOT was seen to be caused by exceptional events which 
required exceptional measures, its geopolitics had no historical traces in both a political 
sense – past experience was irrelevant – and in conceptual terms, for it was not legitimated 
by, or cast in the mould of any established lineage of geopolitical thought (pace Kearns, 
2006). The new basing strategy envisioned a 'global force management system' (US DoD, 
2004a: 8) that moved 'away from […] threat -based' towards 'capability–based' military 
planning (OBC, 2005: 2) in order to cope with 'uncertainty' as the defning condition of the 
global environment (US DoD, 2004a: 5-6). In addition, the GPR was simultaneously moving 
away from the geographical specifcation of potential threats to US security (Critchlow, 
2005: 4), signalling a second distinctive characteristic of the GWOT geopolitics.
Although small in scale by design, the combined effect of the envisaged network of 
lily-pads was meant to be, in terms of spatial coverage and political ingress, nothing less 
than total. The GPR was key to the successful prosecution of the GWOT precisely because 
it created the ability to act 'on a global basis – across theatres' (US DoD, 2004a: 8). All the 
situational assessments and responses for which the GPR laid the logistical foundation 
8were going to be 'from the standpoint of the world and not just of a region' (US DoD, 
2004b: 6). In essence, this meant that the GWOT's was a territorially non-specifc geopolitics: 
its drive for total global access operated a 'respatialization of the globe' (Ingram, 2009: 257) 
which rendered all particular locations – customarily the central object of classical 
geopolitics – insignifcant in themselves. Lily-pads enabled 'fexibility and speed of 
response to anywhere' (Critchlow, 2005: 8, emphasis added). In the spatial economy of the 
GWOT, the value of lily-pads was thus derived from the totality to which they gave access, 
rather than their geopolitical specifcity. This created a paradoxical spatial disassociation in 
which location lost its intrinsic signifcance, while its new value in the currency of the 
GWOT was established as a function of the spatial totality of the globe to which it could 
facilitate access.
This relates to the third distinctive characteristic: the GPR entrenched a geopolitics 
of transit. The GPR's governing principle was that of 'military access' (US DoD, 2004a: 4), 
which combined the ambition of global coverage with freedom from any local constraints 
(Bloomfeld, 2006: 57; Henry, 2006: 42). The network geometry of the GPR bypassed regional
segregation altogether, aiming to facilitate military action 'both within and across various 
regions of the world', and more specifcally to enable power projection across 'seams' (US 
DoD, 2004a: 9; Garamone, 2004a, 2004b; Isenberg, 2004: 2). Yet as mentioned above, in this 
geopolitical logic it was not the lily-pads as such that mattered: what mattered was that the 
military units stationed in them could 'jump from country to country on a moment's notice'
(Schrader, 2003: 3), allowing the deployment of US forces 'wherever and whenever they are 
needed' (US DoD, 2004a: 15). Instead of the fxed architecture of past imperial geopolitics 
where military bases enabled primarily the control of the space of their location, the 
network geography of the GPR was designed to ensure 'fow [...] into, through, and from' 
theatres of operations (US DoD, 2004a: 9). As '[platforms] from which to send U.S. troops 
elsewhere' (Schrader, 2003: 3, emphasis added), the lily-pads were always meant to facilitate 
transit, rather than presence, as had long been the case with the US troops stationed in post-
WW2 Europe, for example.
From this reading, it could be argued that the GPR did indeed envisage a 
'transformation of territories in the metropolitan imagination' (Said, 1994: 21) through an 
indiscriminate enfolding of all regions into a single political-logistical space which 
'[stripped] margins of their context' (Kuus, 2013: 33). But as will be shown in the next 
sections, the superimposition of this geopolitical framework on the context where lily-pads 
were to be established elicited a local reading that was different yet not new, contradictory 
yet not subversive, autochthonous yet residually hegemonic.
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Even though the establishment of the lily-pads was given special signifcance in 
Romania, it cannot be considered in isolation from other policies locally adopted in the 
context of the war on terror. Offcial statements never reproduced the momentarily 
infamous comment of a local editorialist that 9/11 constituted an 'excellent opportunity', 
but the Romanian political elite was quick to understand that all its foreign policy 
objectives would be affected. In addition to the 2005 agreement to host the lily-pads, the 
marks of the GWOT can be identifed in three other major areas: NATO membership; the 
2002 Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA) with the US; and in Romania's 2007 National 
Security Strategy.
In 2001, Romania was yet to achieve its two long-standing objectives of joining 
NATO and the EU, so its reading of the consequences of 9/11 was initially entirely 
subsumed to these goals. NATO membership in particular had to be re-packaged in the 
vernacular of the GWOT, because the principles of enlargement, formulated in the mid-90s,
were incongruous with the 'coalitions of the will' required by Donald Rumsfeld's new 
vision for international cooperation. As a result, the Romanian government gradually 
shifted its argument for membership to emphasise the ability to contribute to the fght 
against terrorism. The Parliament's decision, adopted on 19 September 2001 with only one 
abstention, stipulated that Romania would act 'as a de facto NATO ally', participating with 
NATO member states in actions to 'combat international terrorism […] including through 
military means', and would allow, at NATO's request, the use of 'all facilities on Romanian 
air, land, and maritime territory in support of counter-terrorist operations' (RParl, 2001). 
This also led to the strong support Romania offered to the US decision to invade Iraq in 
2003 (Vilnius 10, 2003), and to the Romanian government's collusion with the US 
programme of 'extraordinary rendition'. Although vehemently denied by the Romanian 
government (BBC Ro, 2007), its involvement was cited in the reports of the Council of 
Europe and the EU Parliament (PACE, 2006a: 19-20; PACE, 2006b; PACE, 2007; EP, 2007), 
and was recently acknowledged by Romanian politicians at the highest level (Actmedia, 
2015).
Directly related to the establishment of the lily-pads was the signing on 1 August 
2002 of a Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA, or 'Article 98' Agreement), designed to 
prevent the prosecution of American citizens by the International Criminal Court (ICC, 
1998: 69). Evidently, the BIA was intrinsically linked to the context of the GWOT. As one of 
its key architects indicated, the US had urged 'doctrinal and legislative changes in allied 
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capitals consistent with the practical realities of the war on terrorism' (Bloomfeld, 2006: 61;
62), and BIAs were a pivotal element in the US effort to 'institutionalize the GWOT 
domestically and internationally' (US JCS, 2006: 19). Between 2002 and 2005 the US 
government conducted an intensive campaign which led to the signing of over 100 BIAs. 
Romania was the frst European state to sign such an agreement (and one of the very few to
do so) even though the EU had asked the candidate states to not sign BIAs until it 
formulated a common position (CEU, 2002). Although not ratifed by the Romanian 
parliament (Mediafax, 2008), the treaty was considered 'a striking act of Realpolitik' (Brucan,
2005: 3) that clearly put the bilateral relationship with the US at the top of Romania's 
foreign policy agenda (Moldovan et al., 2009: 12; PACE, 2007: 27).
A longer term impact of the GWOT could be seen in the 2007 National Security 
Strategy (NSSR). To a certain extent, the glaring infuence of the GWOT on the NSSR is 
unsurprising. Earlier documents of this type had also provided readings of the 
international context that were favourable to the main vectors of Romania's security policy, 
rendering its choices necessary and inevitable. Consequently, the tropes of the GWOT 
pervaded the Strategy, its authors explicitly seeking to formulate a document that would 
'legitimate the participation of national forces to the global war against terrorism' (NSSR, 
2007: 24). Thus, the Romanian government adopted unreservedly the doctrine of pre-
emptive war advocated by the US (White House, 2002) – itself met with much criticism, 
both domestically and internationally – as a necessary and legitimate stance in the fght 
against terrorism. Although eliminated from the fnal version, the frst draft also included 
references to another voguish, but no less controversial trope of the GWOT, stipulating that
'Romania will participate to actions of coalitions of the will, according to […] the principle 
of the right to individual and collective self-defence' (DNSSR, 2006: 12-13).
Most of the local media reaction noted that Romania lacked the capabilities to 
pursue a true doctrine of pre-emptive war, and that the cloning of the US position was 
likely to make Romania a target of terrorist attacks (Stan, 2007: 3; IPP, 2005: 59; Institutul 
PRO, 2006: 3). Notably, a representative of the then opposition (SDP) also claimed in a 
parliamentary debate that such conspicuous alignment with the US security philosophy 
meant that Romania's 'national security strategy is suffused with a neoconservative view of 
the world and Romanian society, [which] makes possible the establishment of an 
authoritarian political regime' (Stan, 2007: 3; also IOŞ, 2006: 16). The reference to the 
ideological underpinnings of the GWOT was all the more striking given that SDP had led 
the government that had signed the Romanian-US BIA in 2002, when then-President Ion 
Iliescu (also SDP) declared that Romania and the US had 'identical positions on the way to 
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address the great challenges that the international community is facing, including the 
threat of terrorism' (cited in PACE, 2007: 28). In contrast, the NSSR was seen to undermine
Romania's international identity, because by '[borrowing] from the American version its 
missionary vocation', Romania would appear to 'position itself as a regional power with a 
civilizing role in the Black Sea region' (IOŞ, 2006: 16).
While these critiques alluded to the subversive effects of the GWOT, they neither 
had a signifcant political impact, nor were they explicitly connected to Romania's 
participation in the global base structure proposed in the GPR. It was this policy that fully 
integrated Romania in the geopolitical template of the GWOT, and at the same time, 
provided a prominent stage for the assertion of its own geopolitical identity.
A PALIMPSEST FOR THE GWOT
In the run-up to the offcial launch of the GPR, Pentagon offcials had been 
sounding out partners around the world to identify potential sites for the new lily-pads 
(Anderson, 2003; BBC, 2003; Fuller, 2003; US DoD, 2003), and Romania offered to host 
bases from the early stages of these consultations (Moldovan et al., 2009: 11). Following 
several high-level meetings (Ziua, 2005) and three years of expert-level negotiations 
(Moldovan et al., 2009: 15-16), the deal was signed on December 6th 2005 and ratifed by the 
Romanian Parliament on July 6th 2006, establishing the use by US forces of four facilities of 
various sizes and purposes (RParl, 2006a; b, RMFA, 2005).
News of the successful negotiation of the US presence in Romania was immediately 
sloganised in both media and offcial reaction, led by then-foreign minister Mihai Răzvan 
Ungureanu's proclamation 'The Americans are coming!' (Munteanu, 2005; Orescu, 2005). In
direct reference to one of the defning elements of Romania's post-communist folklore 
(Lefter, 2005), according to which Romanians had been 'waiting for the Americans to arrive'
since the end of World War II, the lily-pads were seen as nothing less than the fulflment of 
a national 'dream' and 'ancient expectation' (RParl, 2007). Parliamentary grandiloquence 
aside, there can be little doubt that the signifcance of the bases stretched well beyond the 
mere augmentation of Romania's military capability, because the number of US troops 
stationed in Romania was capped at 3000, with limited equipment and rotated for training 
purposes. Although the cap was lifted in April 2015 by decision of the Romanian 
Parliament (Diac, 2015), the bases have never been used to full capacity, much to the 
disappointment of the Romanian hosts (Coon, 2008; Moldovan et al., 2009).  As of June 
2015, the US had a total of 620 troops deployed in Romania (Pantazi and Cozmei, 2015).
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Yet contrary to what one might expect in the case of such a signifcant policy, 
Romanian offcials did relatively little to explain its rationale (Moldovan et al., 2009: 12-14). 
Despite being hailed as a 'national issue' for Romania, neither the consultations announced
in 2003 (US DoD, 2003), nor the joint session of the two houses of the Romanian 
Parliament which subsequently approved the stationing of US troops on Romanian 
territory (RParl, 2007), shed too much light on the precise reasons why the Romanian 
government took this decision. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs press communiqué ran 
through a list of positive effects of the basing agreement which included 'strengthening 
Romania's strategic profle, […] the consolidation of national security, increased 
interoperability with US and other allied armies, and increasing Romania's attractiveness 
for foreign business and capital' (RMFA, 2005). The national security dimension stretched 
beyond the war on terror to include Romania's long-standing concern with Russia's 
infuence (Popa, 2005: 34), and the related issues of energy security and security 
institutionalisation in the Black Sea region, both high on Romania's foreign policy agenda 
at the time (Băsescu, 2005: 4; RParl, 2007: 3). Other offcial positions contained similarly 
generic references to 'facilitating cooperation' with the United States (ISN, 2005) or to 
'diplomatic and economic gains' (BBC, 2005; Sullivan 2006) – the latter, always likely to be 
minor given the size and limited activity of the bases (GMF, 2005), and proving very slow (if 
at all) to materialize (Martinescu, 2009).
As head of the US negotiating team Ambassador Robert Loftis averred (personal 
interview), the message coming from the Romanian establishment was that the US military 
presence was simply a good in itself. It should be surprising therefore that the bases did 
not cause any controversy, either in the Romanian political establishment – the agreement 
was ratifed unanimously, while the law approving the stationing of US troops was adopted 
with only one vote against – or in the wider public, where the presence of American bases 
enjoyed a high level of approval (IPP, 2005: 74-77). However, this seemingly whimsical 
enthusiasm becomes comprehensible if seen in the context of the Romania's geopolitical 
mythology. From that vantage point, the decision appears driven by what was perceived in 
Romanian policy circles as a perfect match between the requirements of the GPR and the 
geopolitical offer of Romania. Romania was presented as the ideal lily-pad, satisfying all the
three conditions of the GPR stipulated above: willing, fexible, and conveniently located. 
But this was more than a case of Romania ftting the lily-pad profle like the proverbial 
glove: the GPR itself appeared as a geopolitical vision that fnally grasped Romania's 
signifcance.
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In other words, this was neither a case of hegemonic geopolitics being written on a 
blank manuscript, nor one in which it erased the local geopolitical script. Rather, the 
implementation of the GWOT was made possible by the geopolitical knowledge already 
scripted locally. Understanding the localization of the GWOT requires therefore an 
understanding of Romania's own geopolitical culture.
No Place Like Home: Romania's Exceptionalist Geopolitics
It is indeed possible to identify a distinctly Romanian geopolitics, whose contours 
continue to be drawn in political, media, academic and popular discourse. Like all 
geopolitical cultures (Ó Tuathail, 2004), Romania's is also smelted from a combination of 
sedimented national memories, a militarized reading of geography, and circumstantial 
interest. Early Romanian geopolitical thought was intrinsically related to the formation of 
the Romanian state and the territorial repercussions of the two world wars. Its central 
principles, 'unity' and 'continuity', were both essential for authenticating the spatial, ethnic,
geographic, and economic coherence of the Romanian state, as well as the historical 
permanence of the Romanian people in the 'natural' areal defned by its borders (for recent
treatments, see Bowd and Clayton, 2015, Cioculescu 2009; for more extensive histories of 
Romanian geopolitical thought, see Cotoi, 2000, esp. 180-207; Didă, 2010a, b; Dobrescu, 
2003, esp. 25-36; Posea, 1994; Săgeată, 2011; Simileanu and Săgeată, 2009). These themes are
now taken for granted in Romanian geopolitics, whose contemporary infections are tuned 
in to the requirements of other foreign policy issues, from energy security to the Black Sea 
region (Ciută, 2008) and the after-effects of the ongoing Crimean crisis.2
Signifcantly for the purpose of our argument, Romanian geopolitics is the product 
of often contradictory interpretations and appropriations of 'other' geopolitical ideas – 
from Ancel, de Martonne, Ratzel, Kjellen, and Haushoffer in the early years (Bowd and 
Clayton, 2015) to Mackinder, Kissinger and Brzezinski more recently (Nazare, 2005; Pintescu,
2005). From the perspective of grounded critical geopolitics, there are two issues that stand 
out here. First, this signals that the geopolitics of the GWOT found in Romania a 
geopolitics already characterised by heteroglossia, distilled from multiple strands of earlier 
hegemonic geopolitics. Second, the study of this context produces a 'view from below' that 
challenges the normative assumptions of critical geopolitics: on the one hand, it can be 
considered locally 'authentic', yet on the other, it contains obvious historical traces of 
hegemonic geopolitics.
While its defning characteristics are not necessarily unique, uniqueness defnes 
Romania's geopolitical identity, which is built on a series of remarkable singularities: 
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uncommon location, exceptional 'geostrategic' worth, perennial political signifcance, and a 
long history as a geopolitical object combined with chronic attempts at establishing its own
geopolitical subjectivity. Romania's unique location is undoubtedly the central trope in 
these geopolitical discourses. In global terms, Romania is seen as the place, and therefore all
serious geopolitical projects need this place. Assertions of geopolitical exceptionalism are of 
course far from unique (Jones and Clark, 2012; Kuus, 2007) – even if both the meaning of 
exceptionalism, and its sources, are often imprecise and vary considerably – and also never 
isolated from the domestic dimension of base politics (Calder, 2007; Cooley, 2005; Cooley, 
2007; Warf, 1997; Woodward, 2004). But in this particular geopolitics, exceptional location is 
matched by exceptional signifcance. Even before Romania was actually 'Romania', historical
political fgure I.C. Brătianu was advocating the signifcance of the Romanian Principalities 
as 'the key to the Orient' (cited in Stoicescu, 2008: 152), foreshadowing both the logic of 
classical geopolitics as we know it today, and its most well-known dictum, Mackinder's 'who
rules Eastern Europe commands [...] the world' (Mackinder, 1919:186). In similar vein, 
former president Iliescu contended in 2003 – the year preceding Romania's accession to 
NATO, and the launch of the GPR – that Romania's 'role as “pivot” (plaque tournante) in 
intra-and extra-European relations' was essential for understanding its 'geostrategic utility' 
(Iliescu, 2003: 27).
The third defning characteristic is that Romania's is a geopolitics of convergence. 
Romania, former president Iliescu was again arguing in 1994, 'is not only in the Centre of 
Europe, but in the centre of Central Europe' (Iliescu, 1994). An array of spatial metaphors 
accompanies all accounts of Romania's history and geopolitics: axes and crossroads, bridges
and corridors, they all lead to Romania; even buffers and barriers are buffers and barriers 
because fuxes – of empires, trade, energy or logistics – inexorably converge towards it (for a
detailed discussion, see Stoicescu, 2008: 141-239). It was the fate of Romania – the story 
goes – to simultaneously separate imperial ambitions, and to unite Europe (Iliescu, 1994). 
This was seen to be particularly relevant in the security environment of post-Cold War 
Europe, where Romania was seen to be at 'the crossing point of geopolitical and strategic 
axes [and] the knot which coherently closes the regional security network' (Constantinescu, 
1997: 6), an 'outpost of a logical strategic system, bridging the Baltic sea to the Black Sea, 
branching out to the Caspian Sea and the Adriatic Sea' (Pleşu, 1998: 4), and a 'bridge 
between civilisations and different economic and cultural interests' (NSSR, 2007: 18).
To be sure, the accuracy or compatibility of these spatial metaphors is open to 
discussion, and Romania is not the only palimpsest on which we can fnd heteroglossic 
traces of multiple hegemonic geopolitical narratives (Bassin and Aksenov, 2006). Yet the 
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strength of sedimented local geopolitical knowledges rarely lies in their accuracy, but in 
their ability to glue together disparate national memories and hybrid voices, establishing 
the 'blissful clarity' (Barthes, 1973: 143) through which unfamiliar worlds and events are 
translated into the familiar and inevitable. Against assumptions of the extirpative power of 
hegemonic geopolitics, it should thus be unsurprising that Romania's reception of the GPR
was conditioned by its own deeply sedimented geopolitics. But in stark contrast to the 
other local contexts mentioned at the start, here the GPR was read as a validation of 
Romania's geopolitical identity. And yet, as will be shown in the next section, this reading 
was profoundly contradictory, working against the defning features of the geopolitics of the
GWOT, and simultaneously against Romania's own geopolitics.
GROUNDED GEOPOLITICS: COMPLIANCE, RESISTANCE, DISSONANCE
Key to understanding the localization of hegemonic geopolitics in this case is not 
just the fact that the geopolitics of the GWOT was different from Romania's geopolitical 
mythology. The sui generis, territorially non-specifc, transit geopolitics of the GWOT stands 
indeed in high contrast with Romania's exceptionalist geopolitics of place, signifcance, and
convergence, and the fundamental differences between the strategies and geographic scales
used by Romania and the US were explicitly acknowledged by Romanian offcials 
(Strategikon, 2006: 20). What is equally signifcant about their encounter is the manner in 
which, paraphrasing Genette again, one has been read through the other. Seen from 
Romania, the GWOT looked different, its geopolitics appropriated and translated through 
the local geopolitical vernacular. The local reception of the GPR activated both the 
sedimented tropes of Romania's geopolitical identity, and the heteroglossic refex that 
created them. The result was a spectacular negation of the geopolitical principles carried by
the GPR, negation made even more striking by the fact that it came in the course of a 
manifestly wholehearted embrace.
To begin with, contact with the Romanian context effectively abolished the original 
geopolitical solipsism of the GPR. Contrary to its intended philosophy, the GWOT was read
locally not as a fundamental geopolitical shift, but rather, as a sort of return to normality – 
the normality of a familiar geopolitical logic. In this logic, the bases were seen to 
demonstrate the traditional – in historical, as well as geopolitical terms – interest of the US 
(not only of Romania) in the 'Eurasian Rimland' (Popa, 2005: 27), as well as the fact that 'the
role of the military and geographic location [was] increasing' (Paşcu, 2002). 'Location' was 
indeed the dominant trope in the Romanian narrative regarding the US bases, aided by the 
extolment of Romania's 'favourable geographic position' by American offcials 
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(Condoleezza Rice, in Perescu, 2005). Indeed, most of the media and political commentary 
seemed to agree that 'the basic attraction of Romania as a new base of operations for US 
forces is geographic' (Shimkus, 2006: 5). 
However, by abrogating the uniqueness of the geopolitics of the GWOT, its local 
reading also resignifed 'location' diametrically. 'Places, not bases' was the principle 
epitomising the geographically anti-specifc and politically noncommittal nature of the 
GPR (US Senate, 2004: 28). Originally, this axiom was designed to signal the need to 
overcome the constraints of, and what was perceived as an over-attachment to the old 
(MOB) format of US bases such as those from Japan and Germany. As argued in the second 
section, attachment to 'place' signifed attachment to a global panorama in which the 
primary criterion for the selection of base sites was access, not location. For this, the GPR 
had placed from the outset 'a premium on developing more fexible legal and support 
arrangements with our allies and partners where we might choose to locate, to deploy, or to 
exercise our troops' (US Senate, 2004: 9). The US had made clear that 'host countries that 
would impose nettlesome constraints on the out-of-country deployability of U.S. forces 
should not expect to be signifcant hubs in the new American defense posture' (Bloomfeld,
2006: 57). Troops were to be deployed only 'in a place where people agree with what you're 
doing, so they don't shut down ports and they don't shut down airfelds' (Schrader, 2003: 2).
During the US Senate hearing of the GPR, senators also emphasised that 'military leaders 
[in Bulgaria and Romania] […] offered things that the Europeans never did, the Western 
Europeans' (US Senate, 2004: 71). In this sense, a senior US offcial declared at an early 
stage of the negotiations that Romania was 'willing to open things up to us without 
signifcant restrictions' (Dunham, 2004). Thus, the 'places' envisaged by the access principle
in the geopolitics of the GWOT were not the lily-pads themselves, but elsewhere.
But in a reversal of the transitional non-specifcity of the GPR, to their hosts the 
bases demonstrated the signifcance of Romania as a 'geopolitical area of strategic 
importance' (NSSR, 2007:  29), as well as America's commitment to Romania. As a 
consequence, the GPR appeared both visionary and pragmatic in its recognition of 
Romania's 'geostrategic capacity', which had only become more relevant in the context of 
the GWOT (Cotidianul, 2001). In the local heteroglossic reading of the GWOT, the lily-pads
were thus taken as the ultimate vindication of local geopolitics: a peremptory, indisputable 
proof of Romania's geostrategic worth (Moldovan et al., 2009: 12; Popa, 2005: 32).
Yet it was not only the geopolitics of the GWOT that was undermined in this 
profession of geopolitical self-worth; Romania's geopolitical identity was also denied at the 
very moment it was asserted. From the start, the status of a lily-pad had been defned by the
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contradiction between the need for maximum fexibility of deployment and the long-term 
commitment necessary for effective security cooperation with the host states (O'Hanlon, 
2008: 6). From the perspective of the architects of the GPR, the lily-pads were the antithesis
of the geostrategic apotheosis their Romanian hosts constantly imagined them to be. As 
former SACEUR General James L. Jones put it, 'we could use [a base] for six months, turn 
off the lights, and go to another base if we need to' (Isenberg, 2004: 2). In other words, the 
lily-pads that maximized access and fexibility were useful because they were disposable; 
paradoxically, the perfect lily-pad was not one that was geostrategically important, but one 
that did not matter at all.
In perfect alignment with the seam geometry of the GPR, Prime Minister Năstase 
argued in front of a US audience in 2003 that the Romanian lily-pads would constitute 'an 
excellent platform for various regions' (Fuller, 2003). Critics of NSSR 2007 later noted the 
fracture between the access logic of the GWOT and Romania's geopolitical identity, 
arguing that 'Romania defnes itself and adopts the identity of a […] space of transition' 
(IOŞ, 2006: 8, emphasis added). Embracing the identity of a lily-pad thus meant cancelling 
la pièce de résistance of Romania's archetypical representation of itself in geopolitical terms, 
because the signifcance of its own location was completely lost in the GPR's 'logic of global
geography' (Bloomfeld, 2006: 50).
Furthermore, the historical foundations of the two geopolitical visions were in 
constant tension, oscillating between self- and mutual subversion. On the one hand, 
Romania's geopolitical exceptionalism suffers from a familiar paradox. While the history of 
Romania, Europe, and geopolitics itself are taken as proof of Romania's geopolitical 
signifcance, its exceptionalism is considered beyond the caprice of history, changing 
political landscapes, or new policy agendas. On the other hand, this geopolitical mythology, 
painstakingly sourced in Romanian history, was incompatible with the geopolitics of the 
GWOT precisely because of the historical prejudice it was built upon. No myths, memories 
or histories could be ft into the geopolitics of the GWOT because the GWOT had no 
history, premised as it was on its own unprecedented nature, which was the ultimate source
of its exceptionality and legitimacy.
Thus, the local inscription of the GWOT was inescapably paradoxical: its geopolitics
was simultaneously embraced and negated in the name of a local geopolitics that was 
simultaneously celebrated and abjured in the negation as well as in the embrace of the 
hegemonic narrative. The heteroglossia inherent in the scripting on the local palimpsest 
generated a perpetual dissonance which turned upon both voices, sabotaging their self-
assured geopolitical logic only to demand renewed enunciations in an unchanged register.
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CONCLUSION
What signifcance do the tensions, collusions and contradictions highlighted in 
Romania's case have for a grounded-contextual critical geopolitics? Three inter-related 
issues stand out. The frst is that this particular context illustrates once more the 
'palimpsestuous' nature and irreducible heteroglossia of geopolitical knowledge. As we 
have seen, only in a monoglossic reading of the geopolitics of the GWOT it would appear 
that it was unquestioningly 'imported' and 'lauded', as Agnew suggested (2007: 145). An 
understanding of geopolitics as palimpsest helps historicise and nuance the understanding 
of practices of import, acceptance and resistance alike.
The second issue concerns the fate of local geopolitics beyond the moment of 
encounter with hegemonic geopolitics. Ten years after the lily-pads agreement, Romania's 
sedimented geopolitics seems intact. Its exceptionalist bearings have not been uprooted, 
and it has survived the waning of the military engagements of the GWOT in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the areas which the lily-pads were designed to enable transit to. Furthermore, 
the disappearance of the lily-pads from the headlines did not prompt any geopolitical soul-
searching. Instead, their role in Romanian geopolitical lore was taken by a new base, the 
site for the Aegis-Ashore component of the European phased-adaptive approach to missile 
defence (EPAA) of the US and NATO. Romania was again an early and enthusiastic 
participant to this project (BBC, 2010; Marinaş, 2010); the agreement to host the missile site 
was signed on 13 September 2011, and came into force on 23 December 2011 after 
ratifcation by the Romanian Parliament (RParl, 2011). It would be the task of a different 
article to analyse the geopolitics of US missile defence, but there are signs that its logistical 
blueprint has replaced the reliance on short-term disposable bases with a focus on ultra-
mobility through long term commitment to partners in familiar regional frames (US DoD, 
2010a, b). Despite these differences, Romania's participation in the EPAA and the GPR has 
been signifed geopolitically in the exact same terms. Romania's geopolitical importance 
was seen to have 'reached maximum' through its participation to the missile shield (Foreign
Minister Cristian Diaconescu, in Popescu and Dobreanu, 2011), which constituted yet 
another spectacular recognition of Romania's 'geostrategic position' (RMFA, 2013: 4). In 
short, local geopolitical palimpsests turn out to be signifcantly more resilient than it is 
usually assumed.
This brings us to the third and fnal issue, regarding the normative implications of 
such geopolitical intersections. The Romanian context gives pause to the belief in the 
'moral authority of the view from below', which as shown at the start, is intrinsic to the 
mandate of subaltern geopolitics in particular, and critical geopolitics more generally 
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(Sharp, 2011: 304). Even if Romania's role in the GPR placed it in a subaltern or marginal 
position, Romania is certainly not seen, at least in local offcial or media discourse, as a 
'victim of US geopolitics' (Ibid.). And even if it is possible to argue that its reception in 
Romania destabilised and subverted the geopolitics of the GWOT, this subversion was the 
product of a contradictory celebration, rather than a deliberate strategy of resistance. Not 
only this, but whatever destabilisation of the hegemonic geopolitics of the GWOT took 
place, it happened from the perspective of a different kind of hegemonic geopolitics, more 
Mackinderian than Rumsfeldian in favour, although equally heteroglossic. So if anything, it
should fall to a critically grounded analysis to denounce the geopolitics underpinning this 
'view from below', whose claim for moral authority is at best tenuous. This is not to argue 
that critical geopolitics necessarily fails its normative mission in this case, but rather, that 
this mission is clearly dependent on, and would be enhanced by, contextual sensitivity.
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1A review of the extensive critical geopolitical literature would far exceed the space available in 
this article, so the argument will work with the relatively safe assumption that the readers of 
Political Geography are familiar with its key tenets and its normative tenor more specifcally.
2Even an abridged review of the literature published in Romania on this topic would take 
considerable space. The open-access journal GeoPolitica: Revistă de Geografe Politică, GeoPolitică şi 
GeoStrategie (http://bit.ly/1KfeAwS) is a useful source (with material occasionally published in 
English) which illustrates the tropes of Romanian geopolitics, as well as its constant mapping 
onto current offcial state discourse on foreign and security policy.
